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About ISER The Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) is an institute within 
the College of Business and Public Policy at UAA, with a staﬀ of approximately 35—includ-
ing faculty, research associates, and support staﬀ. ISER has been at the forefront of public 
policy research in Alaska for half a century. ISER’s multidisciplinary staﬀ studies virtually 
all the major public policy issues Alaska faces. That work helps Alaskans better understand 
the state’s changing economy and population—and the challenges and opportunities that 
come with change. 
All ISER’s research is available to the public, and ISER ensures Alaskans benefit from 
that research by disseminating publications, presentations, and other products online and 
in hard copy to government agencies, private businesses, libraries, the press, and individual 
Alaskans. ISER faculty and staﬀ routinely present to public and private groups around the 
state, and sometimes in other states or countries. All recent and many older publications 
are available online. ISER researchers also routinely respond to inquiries from the press and 
the public. 
Besides doing research, ISER faculty teach graduate and undergraduate classes at UAA. 
Classes taught vary by semester, but include economic research, history of the Alaska econ-
omy, environmental economics and policy, public land management, research methods, and 
communication policies and strategies. ISER also frequently hosts visiting researchers and 
employs student interns. 
About the Author Andrew Bibler is an Assistant Professor of Economics at ISER and 
in the Department of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Alaska Anchorage. 
He received a Ph.D. in Economics from Michigan State University in 2016, and joined UAA 
in August 2016. 
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1 Executive Summary  
The four guardrails that a successful 1332 waiver must meet are as follows: 
1.  Coverage - There must be at least a comparable number of individuals with coverage 
under the waiver as would have had coverage without the waiver. 
2.  Aﬀordability – The waiver should not result in an increase in out-of-pocket spending 
required of residents to obtain coverage, relative to income. 
3.  Comprehensiveness – The waiver should not decrease the number of individuals with 
coverage that meets the essential health benefits (EHB) benchmark. 
4.  Deficit Neutrality – The waiver should not have any negative impact on the federal 
deficit. 
In this report, the first three guardrails are briefly discussed to reaﬃrm that the actuarial 
analysis conducted by Oliver Wyman demonstrates that the proposed waiver meets them. 
The actuarial report from Oliver Wyman projects that the proposed waiver will increase the 
number of individuals taking up insurance in the individual market, lower average premiums, 
and have no impact on the comprehensiveness of coverage. The numbers reported in the 
actuarial analysis are then used to help evaluate the impact that the proposed waiver will 
have on the federal budget. There are at least four ways in which the waiver will have an 
important impact on the federal budget, which are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Impact of Proposed Waiver on Budget 
Direction of Eﬀect 
APTC Savings + 
Individual Shared Responsibility Payments -
Health Insurance Providers Fee -
Federal Exchange User Fees -
Overall Impact on Budget + 
The first and most important impact of the waiver is that it will lead to a reduction in pre-
miums. The reduction in premiums reduces the amount of Advanced Premium Tax Credits 
(APTC) that individuals will be eligible for and generates savings of $50 - $100 million per 
year from 2018 through 2026. There are also three routes through which the waiver will neg-
atively impact the budget by decreasing revenue: individual shared responsibility payments, 
health insurance providers fees, and federal exchange user fees. Because the waiver will lead 
to more individuals taking up insurance in the individual market, fewer individuals will owe 
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the individual penalty for not having health insurance. The health insurance providers fee 
depends on the amount of premiums aggregated to the national level. Because the waiver 
depresses premiums in the Alaska individual insurance market, it will have a secondary neg-
ative eﬀect on the total amount collected through the providers fee for years 2019 through 
2026. Lower premiums also reduce the amount collected in federal exchange user fees, a 
3.5% tax imposed on premiums sold through the Federally Facilitated Marketplace. The ag-
gregate impact on the budget is positive, because the APTC savings outweigh the combined 
negative impact of the other three channels. Table 2 summarizes the aggregate impact of 
       the four components on the federal budget.
Year Final Savings 
2016 $0 
2017 $0 
2018 $48,973,684 
2019 $52,260,336 
2020 $56,108,411 
2021 $61,486,732 
2022 $65,612,013 
2023 $72,213,851 
2024 $77,717,467 
2025 $84,814,665 
2026 $91,785,506 
Table 2: Estimated Savings from Waiver 
   (Before Pass-Through Funding)
The overall impact through these four components is about $49 million in savings in 2018. 
Savings increase in every year thereafter, reaching nearly $92 million in 2026. The savings 
listed in Table 2 are before the granting of any pass-through funding, so they suggest that 
as long as pass-through funding is less than or equal to these figures, the proposed waiver 
will meet the federal deficit neutrality requirement. 
2 Introduction  
The first three guardrails are discussed extensively in the actuarial analysis conducted by 
Oliver Wyman. We will briefly discuss them here to reaﬃrm the main points of their analysis, 
and demonstrate how their analysis lends itself to the evaluation of the fourth guardrail, 
which we discuss more extensively below. In the actuarial analysis, Oliver Wyman directly 
modeled the decisions of the residents to forego insurance, or take up insurance in the 
individual, employer, and public markets. They accomplish this by specifying the decisions 
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that Alaska residents face, and they use data on the prior decisions of residents to take 
up insurance in diﬀerent markets to calibrate a microsimulation model that can be used to 
project outcomes under diﬀerent scenarios. They define a waiver and baseline (no-waiver) 
scenario and compare projected outcomes between those scenarios to determine the impact of 
the waiver on various outcomes including the number of individuals who take up insurance 
in each market, the number who choose to forego insurance, average premiums, average 
advance premium tax credits, and out-of-pocket expenses, among other things. They focus 
primarily on demonstrating why the first three guardrails are met based on these projections. 
Coverage The actuarial analysis conducted by Oliver Wyman suggests that the proposed 
waiver will decrease premiums, inducing more individuals to take up insurance coverage in 
every year from 2018 to 2026. The waiver will lead to between 741 and 1,641 more individuals 
being covered each year, thus supporting the first guardrail for the number of individuals 
receiving insurance coverage. Please refer to Table A, and Table 3 of Appendix B in Alaska 
1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification for more details. 
Aﬀordability The actuarial analysis suggest that premiums will be 18 – 20% lower in each 
year, from 2018 – 2016, under the waiver scenario. The increase in average out-of-pocket 
premium contributions and expenditures occurs because the individuals induced to take-up 
coverage by the waiver are less frequently eligible for subsidies, and does not necessarily reflect 
a real increase in the cost of insurance to particular individuals. The estimated decrease in 
premiums provided in the actuarial analysis is critical for evaluating the impact on the federal 
deficit. As discussed below, this premium diﬀerence is the main mechanism that generates a 
positive impact on the federal budget, through decreased costs from lower APTC payments, 
and justifying pass-through funding to enable the continuation of the Alaska Reinsurance 
Program (ARP). Please refer to Tables C, D, and E of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, 
Actuarial Analyses and Certification for more details. 
Comprehensiveness Finally, since the proposed waiver will have no impact on the Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA) essential health benefits, or the Medicaid and Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) standards, there is no anticipated impact of the waiver on the 
comprehensiveness of coverage. 
Due to the thorough and comprehensive review given on the first three guardrails in the 
actuarial analysis, we turn to evaluating the impact of the waiver on the federal deficit. In 
what follows, we draw on the actuarial analysis provided by Oliver Wyman to evaluate the 
potential impact of the waiver on the federal budget. Analysis of the impact on the fed-
eral deficit will rely heavily on the following estimates generated from the actuarial analysis 
conducted by Oliver Wyman: The average and total premiums in each market, advanced 
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premium tax credits, savings in APTC, the number of individuals moving between unin-
sured status and the individual insurance markets, and movement between uninsured status 
and the other insurance markets. The figures produced in the actuarial analysis are critical 
for evaluating the potential impact on the federal deficit, and the accuracy of the following 
analysis is dependent upon those estimates. 
3 Federal  Deficit  Neutrality  
In evaluating any impact on the federal budget, there are many avenues through which a 
waiver could influence federal spending and revenue. However, results from the actuarial 
analysis limit the scope of the possible impacts on the federal budget. The analysis suggests 
that all movement in coverage is between the uninsured category and the individual insurance 
market.1 In other words, the waiver will have no impact on the number of individuals taking 
up employer or government based coverage. The ARP reduces risks to insurance providers in 
the individual insurance market by removing the risk related to covering high-cost individu-
als. The reinsurance program is limited to the individual market, and corresponding eﬀects 
on total premiums are also confined to the individual market, according to the actuarial 
analysis.2 The decrease in individual market premiums is unlikely to induce individuals to 
switch from employer based insurance to individual market insurance, because the cost to 
the insured in premiums tends to be relatively high in the individual market.3 For example, 
in both the baseline and waiver scenarios, the projected average employee monthly premium 
contributions in 2018 are $139 and $170 for small group employer and large group employer 
coverage, respectively. In contrast, the projected average monthly premium contribution in 
2018 for those in the individual market is $274,4 so it is reasonable to find that individuals 
are more likely to take up the employer sponsored insurance when faced with the decision 
between that and coverage in the individual market in either scenario. Since the waiver will 
not influence the number of individuals with employer or government sponsored insurance, 
or the costs in those markets,5 we do not expect any impact of the waiver on related costs 
and revenues, such as excise taxes on high-cost employer sponsored plans, small business 
tax credits, employer shared responsibility payments, tax exclusions related to employer-
sponsored insurance, or changes in Medicaid spending.6 This allows us to focus on a few 
1See Table 3 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B. 
2See Table 21 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B. 
3See Table 20 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B. 
4See Table 19 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B. 
5See Tables 21, 27, and 33 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, 
Appendix B.
6Excluding impacts through these channels hinges on the result that there are no spillovers across in-
surance markets, i.e. a change in the individual market has no impact on the costs or populations in the 
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channels through which the federal budget might be impacted. 
Based on the actuarial analysis, the most important impact that the waiver will have on the 
federal budget is the 20 to 22% reduction in APTC payments. The waiver will allow the 
state to continue funding the ARP, which reduces premiums, and in turn average APTC, 
relative to the baseline scenario. In addition, individuals who are induced to take up cov-
erage in the individual market because of the waiver tend to be healthier, on average, than 
the non-waiver scenario individual market pool. Nearly 84% of the individuals projected to 
take up coverage in the individual market in 2018 because of the waiver are of very good or 
excellent health status.7 Whereas, only about 51% of the projected 2018 individual market 
participants are considered in very good or excellent health in the baseline scenario.8 The 
addition of relatively healthy individuals to the pool could reinforce downward pressure on 
premiums. Additionally, the ARP could encourage potential competition in the insurance 
market, as it reduces risk to the insurers. It is not clear whether the entrance of another com-
petitor would further reduce premiums, but it is possible. In any case, we would not expect 
a new  entrant  to  increase premiums.  However,  if the future  of the ARP  is uncertain,  po-
tential competitors might be less likely to make the investments required to enter the market. 
In short, the eﬀective reduction in the premiums and resulting decrease in total APTC is 
large enough to outweigh any possible negative impact on the federal budget by roughly $49 
million in 2018, a figure that increases gradually to almost $92 million in 2026. There are 
several other influences on the budget that are worth noting. The movement of individuals 
from uninsured to insured status could increase the number of anticipated tax credits to be 
paid out if those individuals are eligible for the credit. This is unlikely to be an important 
factor, because almost every person induced to take up insurance in the individual market 
by the waiver is at or above 400% of the poverty line, and therefore will not receive an APTC 
after joining the individual market.9 As a result, the increase in APTC eligible individual 
market participants in any given year is minimal, and in some cases there is a decline an-
ticipated in APTC eligible participants. The decline is a result of the waiver inducing only 
a small number of APTC eligible individuals to take up insurance, and inducing a slightly 
larger number of individuals in the 300 to 400% FPL income range to choose no insurance 
rather than the lowest level of coverage in the individual market. When the ARP and waiver 
depress premiums, they also depress the APTC, which is based on the second lowest level 
employer sponsored and government based markets. It is diﬃcult to assess the viability of this outcome or 
the potential impact in this particular scenario ex ante. If spillovers do exist, as long as they are minimal 
relative to the other changes, there would be minimal to no impact on the costs and revenues through these 
channels. 
7See Table 15 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B. 
8See Table 13 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B. 
9See Table 9 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B. 
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of coverage (silver). It is possible that individuals in the 300 to 400% FPL income range 
who would otherwise choose the lowest coverage level (bronze) could then find it optimal to 
choose no coverage. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in years 2024 to 2026 there is a 
small increase in the number of projected APTC eligible individuals who take up coverage, 
which would have a net negative eﬀect on the federal budget through increased costs. 
In addition to decreasing costs through APTC payments, the proposed waiver is likely to 
decrease federal revenues in three important ways: through individual shared responsibility 
payments, health insurance provider fees, and exchange user fees. There will likely be a 
decrease in the number of individuals expected to pay the penalty, i.e. the individual shared 
responsibility payment, which constitutes a net loss to the federal budget through decreased 
revenues. The proposed waiver will also influence federal revenue through the exchange user 
fee, which is charged to insurers for using the federal exchange system and based on a per-
centage of the total premiums written through the federal exchange. Because the waiver will 
decrease total premiums written through the federal exchange, the diﬀerence in total pre-
miums multiplied by the fee percentage would represent the decrease in federal revenues.10 
Lastly, the waiver will have an impact on the total amount collected in the health insurance 
providers fee, although the route through which this occurs is more convoluted. The total 
size of the health insurance providers fee is pre-determined through fee year 2018 (based on 
2017 total premiums). The total fee for 2018 is set at $14.3 billion, so the waiver will not 
impact the total collection in 2018. After fee year 2018 the total tax bill is set to increase 
at the same rate as the aggregate written premiums.11 Since the waiver will alter the total 
premiums in the Alaska invididual market, and in turn the total premiums aggregated to 
the national level, it could influence the size of the total fee collected in years 2019 and be-
yond. Tables 1 and 2 above summarize the overall impact the waiver will have on the federal 
budget. In what follows, the diﬀerent channels, APTC savings, individual shared respon-
sibility payments, health insurance provider fees, and exchange user fees, are discussed in 
more detail. A reasonable estimate is provided for the impact of each on the federal budget. 
When considering the decrease in total APTC payments, and the losses in individual shared 
responsibility penalty payments, provider fees, and federal exchange user fees altogether, the 
aggregate impact on the federal deficit, prior to any pass-through funding, is overwhelmingly 
positive. 
10Assuming that the entire diﬀerence in premiums would be subject to the fee. 
11The premium base calculation is more complex than this, but is essentially the aggregate of all premiums 
written with exceptions and reductions for companies that meet certain qualifications. 
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3.1 APTC Savings 
The actuarial analysis projects the total amount of APTC under the waiver and baseline 
scenarios for every year from 2018 to 2026. Using the diﬀerences in these numbers between 
the waiver and baseline scenarios, the projected total APTC is substantially lower under the 
waiver scenario in every year starting in 2018. 
Year Estimated Savings 
2016 $0 
2017 $0 
2018 $51,637,772 
2019 $55,978,906 
2020 $60,181,304 
2021 $65,406,805 
2022 $69,811,961 
2023 $76,720,364 
2024 $82,667,950 
2025 $90,004,673 
2026 $97,550,838 
Table 3: Projected APTC Savings from Waiver 
*Note: See Table 18 of Alaska 1332 
Waiver Application, Actuarial Analy-
ses and Certification, Appendix B. 
In 2018 the estimated savings in APTC payments from granting the waiver is more than 
$51.6 million, and reaches $97.5 million in 2026. The source of the steep growth in savings is 
twofold, stemming from both an increasing raw gap in premiums between the baseline and 
waiver scenarios, and an increasing number of APTC eligible individuals with coverage in 
the individual market. Although the reduction in premiums as a percentage of the baseline 
premium remains relatively stable, between 18 and 20%, the actual gap in premiums grows. 
The projected dollar value of the average gap in premiums goes from $238 in 2018 to $363 in 
2026. The increase in the spread is mainly due to the one-time large increase projected in the 
baseline scenario for 2018, when the ARP is set to end in the baseline scenario. After 2018, 
the average yearly growth in premiums is actually quite similar between the two scenarios, 
but the shock to premiums in 2018 in the baseline scenario eﬀectively sets them at diﬀerent 
base levels leading to an increasing spread in the two numbers over time. The other factor 
contributing to the increasing estimated savings is the increasing number of subsidy eligible 
participants expected to take up coverage in the individual market. The total number of 
individuals expected to take up coverage in 2026 is higher than that number for 2018 in 
both scenarios, but more importantly the income distribution among those individuals is 
changing. The number of subsidy eligible individuals expected to take up coverage in the 
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baseline scenario is 15,640 in 2017, but that number is 19,609 in 2026, meaning 3,969 more 
subsidy-qualifying individuals will have coverage in the individual market.12 For comparison, 
the total market is only expected to see an increase of 698 individuals between those two 
years.13 In other words, the expected change in the composition of the individual market 
is such that they are expected to become increasingly eligible for subsidies over time. This 
phenomenon is not specific to either the waiver or baseline scenario.14 The total savings 
in APTC depends positively on the gap in the average APTC between scenarios, but also 
depends on the total number of APTC eligible individuals with coverage in the individual 
market. Even if an equal number of individuals are eligible in the two scenarios, a higher 
number of eligible individuals increases savings, because more individuals qualify for sub-
sidies. To put it another way, one more subsidy eligible individual taking up coverage in 
the baseline scenario facilitates more savings, even if they take up coverage in the waiver 
scenario as well. This is true because baseline scenario premiums are larger than waiver 
scenario premiums, i.e. subsidy eligible individuals qualify for a larger APTC in the baseline 
scenario than they do in the waiver scenario. 
It is also important to note the relative similarity between the total amount expected in 
state and federal appropriations and funding through the ARP, and the APTC savings. 
For example, the projected cost of funding the ARP in 2018 is roughly $60 million15 and 
the anticipated total reduction in APTC payments is $51.6 million. This is a result of the 
majority of the increase in premiums in the baseline scenario being funded through APTC. 
Individuals who are below 400% FPL do not have to cover the full increase in premiums, 
because they are eligible for APTC. In some cases they would not have to cover any of it. 
This is evident from comparisons of premium and APTC growth in the individual market 
for individuals below 400% FPL. The average individual market premium is expected to 
increase from $947 in 2017 to $1,191 in 2018 in the baseline scenario, an increase of $244.16 
For that same year the projected average APTC increases are $242, $240, and $207 for the 
0 to 199% FPL, 200 to 299% FPL, and 300 to 400% FPL income categories, respectively.17 
A projected 15,943 individuals, 75% of the market, will be under 400% FPL in 2018 and 
eligible for a subsidy. The similarity in the premium and APTC increases for subsidy eligible 
individuals, in conjunction with a large portion of the market being covered by subsidies, 
means that the majority of the premium increases in the baseline scenario would be covered 
by APTC. This is all reflected in the high APTC savings to ARP funding ratio, which is 
86% in 2018. 
12Table 34 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B.  
13Table 1 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B.  
14Tables 7 & 8 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B.  
15Table 23 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B.  
16Table C of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification.  
17Table 34 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B.  
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3.2 Individual Responsibility Insurance Payments 
The estimated savings in APTC produced in the actuarial analysis, and shown in Table 3, 
capture the impact that the passage of the waiver will have on average APTC, as well as any 
increase or decrease in the number of individuals eligible for the APTC. They do not capture 
any impact on the federal budget from the decrease in the number of individuals paying the 
penalty, but the amount of extra revenue from penalties that would be collected absent the 
waiver is a small percentage of the projected APTC savings. Using Congressional Budget 
Oﬃce (CBO) projections and the size of the flat rate individual penalties, two estimates for 
the amount of additional penalties that would be collected if the waiver were not granted 
are obtained. For 2016, an uninsured individual adult without an exemption will pay a 
penalty of $695 or 2.5% of income, whichever is higher, and an uninsured child without an 
exemption would require a payment half that size. However, the average penalty paid by an 
uninsured individual is much lower than this baseline, presumably because many uninsured 
individuals are eligible for an exemption. Based on projections from the CBO, Table 4 shows 
the expected approximate average penalty per uninsured individual for each year.18 
Table 4: Average Penalty for Uninsured 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 
Uninsured 27m 26m 26m 27m 27m 27m 27m 27m 28m 28m 28m 
Total Penalties $3b $3b $3b $3b $3b $4b $4b $4b $4b $4b $5b 
Approximate 
Average $111 $115 $115 $111 $111 $148 $148 $148 $142 $142 $178 
Source: 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51385-
HealthInsuranceBaseline_OneCol.pdf 
Estimates for the number of uninsured are based on calendar year. The estimated penalties collected are 
based on fiscal year. 
If the projections in Table 4 are reflective of the average penalty payments that would be 
made by individuals induced to take up insurance in the individual market, then we can use 
them, in conjunction with the actuarial projections for the number of individuals moving 
from uninsured to insurance in the individual market, to obtain a rough estimate of the 
18https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51385-
HealthInsuranceBaseline_OneCol.pdf (See Table 1, Health Insurance Coverage for People Under Age 
6 5, of CBO report for the number uninsured. See Table 2, Net Federal Subsidies Associated with Health 
Insurance Coverage for People Under Age 65, of  CBO report for the  total penalty payments.)  
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diﬀerence in penalty payments in the waiver and baseline scenarios. The estimated losses in 
penalty payments are displayed in Table 5. Using the flat rate penalty, which is the min-
imum twelve-month penalty to be paid by an uninsured individual without an exemption, 
will produce a more conservative estimate. This rate is $695 for an adult for 2016, and will 
be adjusted yearly. This fee is much higher than the national average penalty paid by an 
uninsured individual shown in Table 4, so we expect these figures to be conservative. One 
likely reason that the average payment from the CBO projections are so much lower than 
the flat rate is that there could be a large number of individuals who are uninsured but ex-
empt from paying the penalty. The exemption for not having access to aﬀordable coverage is 
particularly relevant in this case. If an individual does not have access to coverage that costs 
less than a certain percentage of their income, then they are exempt from the penalty. This 
is especially relevant in Alaska, because of the high premiums in the state. There could be a 
relatively large number of individuals who are not eligible for subsidies but would have to pay 
a high  percentage of  their  income to obtain  coverage,  and  therefore would  not  be required  to  
make an individual responsibility payment if they forego coverage. It is possible that some 
of the individuals who move from uninsured status to the individual market in the waiver 
scenario would not be required to make a penalty payment in the baseline scenario. To the 
extent that the individuals who make that switch are exempt from penalties, the figure using 
the flat rate is overestimating the number of individuals who will have to pay the penalty in 
the baseline scenario. On the other hand, the estimate using the CBO projection is accurate 
if we assume that the portion of the population making that switch to the individual market 
in Alaska is comparable to the national uninsured population in terms of exemption status 
and average penalty payments.19 
Table 5 shows two estimates for the potential loss in individual penalty payments. The 
estimates using the average penalty from the CBO projections, shown in the last column of 
Table 5, range from about $105,000 in 2025 to more than $197,000 in 2020. These estimates 
are much lower than the estimates that assume the average penalty paid by the uninsured 
would equal the flat rate penalty. In 2018 the estimated loss using the flat rate calculation is 
almost $1.2 million, but the estimated loss using the average penalty is only about $189,000 
for the same year. It is diﬃcult to say which is more accurate, because it is not clear from 
the actuarial analysis which individuals would qualify for an exemption. 
One impact of the waiver that is not captured in these estimates is that the lower premiums 
can also change the number of uninsured individuals who would be required to make an indi-
19Without more details on the characteristics of the individuals who are induced to switch from the 
uninsured category to the individual insurance market because of the waiver, we cannot accurately evaluate 
the legitimacy of this assumption. 
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Table 5: Estimated Loss in Penalty Payments 
Change in Insured Estimated Loss  
Year Total Adults Children Using Flat Rate Using Avg. Penalty  
2016 0  0  0  $0  $0
2017 0  0  0  $0  $0
2018 1,641 1,593 48 $1,192,255 $188,715 
2019 1,565 1,516 49 $1,169,925 $173,715 
2020 1,775 1,727 48 $1,369,682 $197,025 
2021 1,234 1,193 41 $977,711 $182,632 
2022 1,210 1,168 42 $986,711 $179,080 
2023 1,182 1,183 -1 $1,010,756 $174,936 
2024 1,227 1,228 -1 $1,080,697 $174,234 
2025 741 740 1 $671,498 $105,222 
      2026 742 741 1 $692,577 $132,076
 
 
*Note: The projected changes in number insured are from Table 12 of Alaska 1332 Waiver 
Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B. The flat rate calculation 
is based on the $695 and $347.50 flat fee for uninsured adults and children in 2016, and 
assuming 3% growth per year. The calculation using the average penalty uses the approx-
imate averages from Table 3 of the CBO report. The estimated impacts of the reduction 
in penalty payments on the budget are based on calendar years and attributed to the year 
that the penalties are based on. However, since penalties are reconciled on tax returns, 
all or a portion of them may be collected in the following year. 
vidual responsibility payment. Since the premiums will be lower in the waiver scenario, the 
income cutoﬀ for whether or not insurance is considered aﬀordable will also diﬀer between 
the two scenarios. There could be a group of individuals who are not eligible for subsidies 
and forego insurance in both scenarios, but would only be required to make a penalty pay-
ment in the waiver scenario. This is most relevant for the group of individuals who are over 
400% FPL, because that is the group that will see the largest change in out-of-pocket premi-
ums. There are more than 14,000 uninsured individuals with income above 400% FPL in the 
waiver scenario in 2018. To the extent that some uninsured individuals would qualify for an 
exemption in the baseline scenario, but not in the waiver scenario because of the depressed 
premiums, this represents a net gain to the federal budget. However, without more precise 
information on the income distribution and other exemption-relevant characteristics of the 
uninsured population, we cannot tell the exact size of this gain. 
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3.3 Health Insurance Providers Fee 
The proposed waiver will also impact the federal budget through the health insurance 
provider fee,20 which is essentially a tax on insurance providers based on the amount of 
premiums that they wrote in the previous year. However, the tax is assessed in such a way 
that the total collection amount from all providers adds up to a pre-specified amount, which 
is already determined through fee year 2018.21 The total amount collected through this tax 
will equal $14.3 billion for 2018. Since the total amount collected is pre-determined, the 
decrease in premiums under the waiver scenario will have no impact on federal revenues 
through this channel for fee year 2018 (collected in 2018 for premium revenues in 2017). For 
years 2019 and beyond, the proposed waiver could decrease the size of the total fee, because 
the total amount of the fee depends on growth in national aggregate premiums for every year 
after 2018. The waiver will impact total national premiums through changes in premiums in 
the individual market in Alaska. The slowed growth in premiums only impacts the individ-
ual market in Alaska, a market of between 23,500 and 25,300 individuals for the years 2019 
through 2026.22 That represents a small fraction of the number of insured individuals across 
the country, but still changes the amount of premiums aggregated to the national level.23 
Table 6 shows yearly estimated losses to the budget that the waiver would cause through 
this channel. Please refer to the appendix for more detail on the health insurance provider 
fee and further explanation on the calculations in Table 6. 
The waiver will have no impact on the total amount collected through the insurer tax in 
2018, because the total amount is already set at $14.3 billion for 2018. The waiver will lead 
to an estimated loss in the total amount collected through the insurer tax of about $900,000 
in 2019. The amount lost increases each year after that, as the size of the market in terms 
of total premiums increases, rising to over $1.9 million in losses for 2026. While these losses 
are substantial, much like the loss in individual penalty payments, they are less than 2% 
of the size of the savings from the reduced APTC in any given year. On average, the size 
of the loss in the insurer tax is about 1.5% of the savings in APTC. This table does not 
capture any diﬀerences in provider fees for years after 2026. Since the estimates provided 
in the table are based on premiums in the prior year, and aggregate premiums are lower in 
2026 in the waiver scenario, we should expect that the waiver will also lead to a reduction 
in the providers fee in 2027 as well. 
20Aﬀordable Care Act Section 9010 
21https://www.irs.gov/irb/2013-51_IRB/ar12.html (see section 57.4 Fee Calculation)
22See Table 2 of Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B. 
23https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51385-
HealthInsuranceBaseline_OneCol.pdf 
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Table         
Year Diﬀerences in Health Insurance Providers Fee 
2016 $0 
2017 $0 
2018 $0 
2019 $900,354 
2020 $1,012,503 
2021 $1,037,013 
2022 $1,173,585 
2023 $1,256,216 
2024 $1,382,168 
2025 $1,539,377 
2026 $1,853,635 
6: Estimated Loss in Health Insurance Providers Fee
*Note: Estimated losses are for calendar years and based on 
premiums from the prior year. Please see the appendix for 
details on how these diﬀerences were calculated. 
3.4 Exchange User Fees 
The decrease in premiums written in the individual market will also have a direct impact on 
the amount collected through the exchange user fee. A 3.5% tax is imposed on all premiums 
that are written through the federal exchange marketplace. Since the Alaska individual 
market uses the federal marketplace, there will be a negative impact on the federal budget 
of 3.5% of the diﬀerence in premiums between the baseline and waiver scenario. The yearly 
diﬀerences in total premiums in the Alaska individual market between the baseline and 
waivers scenarios and the corresponding loss in exchange user fees are listed in Table 7.24 
The waiver leads to about $42 million less in aggregate premiums in the Alaska individual 
market in 2018. The corresponding loss in exchange user fees is 3.5% of the diﬀerence in 
premiums, leading to a loss in user fees of almost $1.5 million in 2018. The loss increases 
gradually as the diﬀerence in total premiums increases, reaching over $3.2 million in 2026. 
Much like the expected losses in insurer tax revenues and individual penalty payments, the 
size of the loss in exchange user fees is small relative to the APTC savings. On average, the 
loss in exchange user fees is about 3% of the savings in APTC. 
24The estimated decreases in revenue displayed in Table 7 assume that all of the premiums in the individual 
market are subject to the fee. They represent a bound of the impact on revenue, because individuals who 
take up insurance are not required to do so through the federal exchange. To the extent that premium 
decreases from the waiver are for premiums that are not written through a federal exchange, and are not 
subject to the fee, the estimates in Table 7 are exaggerating the decrease in revenue to the federal budget. 
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Table 7: Estimated Loss in Exchange User Fees 
Year Diﬀference in Total Premiums Loss in Exchange User Fees 
2016 $0 $0 
2017 $0 $0 
2018 $42,052,366 $1,471,833 
2019 $47,094,038 $1,648,291 
2020 $48,305,929 $1,690,708 
2021 $54,438,525 $1,905,348 
2022 $58,275,748 $2,039,651 
2023 $63,986,881 $2,239,541 
2024 $71,074,775 $2,487,617 
2025 $85,118,080 $2,979,133 
2026 $91,974,844 $3,219,120 
*Note: The projected changes in total premiums come from Table 18 of Alaska 
1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix B. The 
calculation for loss in exchange user fees is based on a 3.5% fee on premiums 
for every year, and assume the entire decrease in premiums due to the waiver 
would have been subject to the fee. The estimated losses in this table are based 
on calendar year and attributed to the same year as the premiums that they are 
attached to. In practice, a portion of the fee may be collected in the following 
calendar year. 
3.5 Overall Impact on Budget 
Comparing the estimates for the losses in individual shared responsibility payments, health 
insurance provider fees, and exchange user fees with APTC savings indicates that the net 
impact on the federal budget is positive and large. Table 8 shows yearly estimates for the 
combined impact of the channels through which the waiver will influence the federal budget, 
savings in APTC payments, and decreases in individual shared responsibility payments from 
uninsured individuals, health insurance provider fees, and exchange user fees. The losses 
in individual penalties in this table are from the calculations using the flat rate penalties, 
which are much higher than projected national average penalty, so the estimates in Table 8 
are relatively conservative. 
All of the estimates shown in Table 8 are for savings prior to any pass-through funding. The 
savings in 2016 prior to any pass-through funding is about $49 million. Moreover, the esti-
mated savings increase every year thereafter and are expected to reach almost $92 million in 
2026. So long as the amount of pass-through funding granted in the waiver does not exceed 
these estimates, the proposed waiver will not have any anticipated negative impact on the 
federal deficit, and could instead have a large positive impact. 
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Table 8: Estimated Savings From Waiver (Before Pass-Through Funding) 
APTC Individual Provider Exchange Final  
Year Savings Penalties Fees User Fees Savings  
2016 $0 - $0 - $0 - $0 = $0 
2017 $0 - $0 - $0 - $0 = $0 
2018 $51,637,772 - $1,192,255 - $0 - $1,471,833 = $48,973,684 
2019 $55,978,906 - $1,169,925 - $900,354 - $1,648,291 = $52,260,335 
2020 $60,181,304 - $1,369,682 - $1,012,503 - $1,690,708 = $56,108,411 
2021 $65,406,805 - $977,711 - $1,037,013 - $1,905,348 = $61,486,732 
2022 $69,811,961 - $986,711 - $1,173,585 - $2,039,651 = $65,612,014 
2023 $76,720,364 - $1,010,756 - $1,256,216 - $2,239,541 = $72,213,851 
2024 $82,667,950 - $1,080,697 - $1,382,168 - $2,487,617 = $77,717,468 
2025 $90,004,673 - $671,498 - $1,539,377 - $2,979,133 = $84,814,665 
2026 $97,550,838 - $692,577 - $1,853,635 - $3,219,120 = $91,785,506 
*Note: The estimated losses in individual penalties and exchange user fees in this table 
are based on calendar year and attributed to the same year as the premiums that they are 
attached to. In practice, all or a portion of those fees may be collected in the following 
calendar year. 
4 Other considerations  
We have considered the most important mechanisms through which the proposed waiver will 
directly impact federal spending and revenues. One indirect avenue through which granting 
a waiver  could  impact  the federal  budget  is through  administrative costs.  However,  the  
proposed waiver will only require granting of pass-through funding and granting a greater 
number of premium tax credits, neither of which are expected to have large impacts on 
administrative costs. 
There are a few small fees collected based on the number of insured individuals. Since the 
waiver will increase the number of insured individuals, it would increase revenue through 
these channels, but the impact would be marginal. One fee that helps to fund the Patient-
Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) is scheduled to equal $2.28 per member 
per year in 2017. This fee is set to increase the following years based on increases in health 
care expenditures, but phase out after 2019. Another per member fee, the risk adjustment 
administration fee, is set for $1.80 per member per year for 2017. Between these two fees, 
the waiver would increase revenue by almost $7,000 in 2018 based on the expected increase 
in number of individuals covered. Given the small increase in total revenue, due to the 
low amount and phasing out of the PCORI fee in 2019, this diﬀerence is omitted from the 
analysis. However, the waiver would have a slight positive impact on government revenue 
through this channel. 
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5 Conclusion  
This report considers the diﬀerent ways in which the proposed waiver may impact the federal 
budget to assist in evaluating whether the waiver will meet the fourth guardrail, that it have 
no adverse impact on the federal deficit. Projections from the actuarial analysis related to 
this waiver proposal are used to rule out a number of mechanisms through which a waiver 
could influence the budget. Because the proposed waiver will only impact movement of indi-
viduals between the uninsured category and the individual insurance market, and will only 
impact premiums in the individual insurance market, we can focus on a few channels through 
which the waiver will impact federal costs and revenues. The most important impact of the 
waiver is that by depressing premiums, it will also drastically decrease the amount of APTC 
payments. The savings generated through this channel are large enough to overpower any 
negative impact on revenues through other channels. With that being said, the proposed 
waiver will likely decrease revenues through at least three channels: individual shared re-
sponsibility payments, health insurance provider fees, and exchange user fees. The increased 
number of individuals taking up insurance in the individual market means that fewer indi-
viduals will be required to make individual responsibility payments. The waiver also reduces 
the aggregate premiums written in the Alaska individual market, which has an impact on 
the total premiums aggregated to the national level, and in turn decreases the total amount 
collected in the health insurance providers fee for years 2019 and beyond. Lastly, revenue 
collected through the exchange user fee, a tax on premiums generated through the federal 
exchange marketplace, will be lower in the waiver scenario, because the waiver decreases 
premiums in the Alaska individual market, which uses a federal exchange marketplace. The 
savings from decreased APTC is much greater than the estimated decreased revenue through 
the other three channels combined, lost penalties paid by uninsured individuals, decreased 
provider fees collected from insurers, and decreased exchange user fees. The analysis of the 
impact of the waiver on the federal deficit suggests that the waiver can meet the fourth 
guardrail of no negative impact on the deficit, although the final impact is dependent on 
the amount of pass-through funding granted. Prior to any pass-through funding, the waiver 
generates savings of about $49 million in 2018. The savings gradually increases all the way 
up to almost $92 million in 2026. So long as the amount of pass-through funding granted by 
the waiver does not exceed these estimated savings (final column of Table 8) then we expect 
the proposed waiver to have no negative impact on the federal deficit. 
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Appendix 
Health Insurance Providers Fee Estimates 
Disentangling the impact of the waiver through the health insurance provider fee is complex 
because of the multiple moving parts and dynamic feature of the fee calculation. The total 
fee for fee year 2019 can be written as a function of the market share of the Alaska individual 
market multiplied by the growth rate in premiums in the Alaska individual market, added 
to the rest of the national market share and growth rate (premiums written in other mar-
kets, aggregated nationally). Using the projections of total premiums written in the Alaska 
individual market produced by the actuarial analysis, along with an assumption about the 
initial total market size and growth rate of the aggregate premiums in all other markets, we 
can calculate the impact of the waiver on federal revenues through this channel. 
The total insurer tax is of a pre-determined size through collection year 2018. It is important 
to distinguish between the year of collection and the year that the collection is based on. In 
2018 the total fee will be $14.3 billion, split across the national industry based on share of 
total premiums written. The $14.3 billion collection will be based on the premium revenues 
in 2017. Thereafter, the total fee will increase at the same rate as the total premiums. Con-
sider the following equations describing the nature of the fee for collection year 2019 (the 
first in which the fee size has not yet been determined): 
National P remiums2018   National P remiums2017P remium Growth2018 = (1) 
National P remiums2017 
T otal F ee2019 = ($14.3 billion) ⇥ (1 + P remium Growth2018) (2) 
This is how the total size of the fee collected in 2019, based on revenues from 2018, will be 
determined.25 Every year after 2019 will follow a similar calculation, where the increase in 
the total fee collected will be tied to growth in premiums. The proposed waiver will impact 
the growth in total premiums because it changes the growth in premiums in the Alaska indi-
vidual insurance market. In order to understand this channel and to calculate the diﬀerence 
in total premiums resulting from the passage of the proposal, it is instructive to re-write 
equation (1) as the weighted summation of the growth in the individual Alaska market and 
the growth in all other markets combined. 
25https://www.irs.gov/irb/2013-51_IRB/ar12.html 
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) ⇥ (GrowthAKIndividual P remium Growth2018 = (Market ShareAKIndividual )2018 2018 
+(1   Market ShareAKIndividual ) ⇥ (GrowthElse (3) 2018 2018) 
In other words, the changes in the Alaska individual market influence the overall growth in 
premiums through the change in share of the total market that the Alaska individual market 
makes up, as well as any change in the growth rate of premiums in the Alaska individual 
market. The actuarial analysis provides projected total premiums in the Alaska market in 
Table 18 of the Alaska 1332 Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Ap-
pendix B, and those numbers are represented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Aggregate Premiums in AK Individual Market 
As shown in Figure 1, the proposed waiver will decrease the total (aggregate) premiums writ-
ten in the Alaska individual market. This just means that the waiver depresses premium 
rates enough to overpower the impact from inducing more individuals to join the market, 
so that aggregate total premiums decrease. The total premium projections were used to 
calculate the growth in total premiums written in the Alaska individual market for both the 
baseline and waiver scenarios, and are displayed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Premium Growth in AK Individual Market 
The biggest deviation of premium growth in the waiver scenario from the baseline scenario 
occurs in 2018, because that is the year that ARP is scheduled to run out if the proposed 
waiver is not granted. As shown in Figure 1, under the waiver scenario aggregate premiums 
actually decrease from 2017 to 2018. On the other hand, in the baseline scenario aggregate 
premiums increase from 2017 to 2018, which is driven by an increase in premium rates. Be-
cause of this diﬀerence in the two scenarios, growth in 2018 is 12% of the baseline scenario, 
but negative in the waiver scenario, about -3%. In the years after 2019, total premiums in 
the Alaska individual market grow at similar rates in the two scenarios. However, this one 
time diﬀerence in growth leads to diﬀerences in market size that are reflected in the relative 
shares of the national market. The market shares under the waiver and baseline scenarios 
are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: National Market Share 
The market shares were estimated by assuming an initial market size and growth rate. The 
initial market size is based on the size of the market in 2013, which comes from an estimate 
of the health insurance providers fee in 2014 as a percentage of total premiums. The total 
providers fee was $8 billion in 2014, estimated to be 1.47% of total premiums. That estimate 
is used to calculate an estimated initial market size ($8 billion)/(0.0147) in 2013. A growth 
rate of the total market premiums of 5% is used to project market size in every year after 
2014. The 5% figure is roughly the average growth rate from 2018 to 2026 in the projected 
total health insurance provider fee, based on the CBO report projecting ACA related fig-
ures.26 The diﬀerences displayed in Figure 3 may seem small, e.g. market shares in 2018 
are about 0.00038 and 0.00044 in the waiver and baseline scenarios, respectively, but they 
still influence the total growth in the market. The weighted growth in the national market 
is shown in Figure 4, which is also the growth rate used to calculate the increases in the 
insurer tax each year. 
The impact on the national premium growth rate mirrors that diﬀerence in the rate in the 
Alaska individual market. The biggest diﬀerence is in 2018, for which the national premium 
growth rates are 0.04997 and 0.05003 in the waiver and baseline scenarios, respectively. 
Again, rates are similar in the years that follow. However, this one time diﬀerence leads 
26https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51385-HealthInsurance 
Baseline_OneCol.pdf (See Table 2, Net Federal Subsidies Associated with Health Insurance Coverage for 
People Under Age 65, of CBO report for projected taxes on health insurance providers for this group of 
individuals.) 
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to diﬀerences in fee size calculated for the 2018 premium revenues (collected in 2019). The 
market shares and growth rates in the Alaska individual market, along with figures for the 
size of the national market and growth rates, were used in Equation 3 to calculate the total 
size of the health insurance providers fee in the waiver and baseline scenarios. 
Figure 4: National Premium Growth (Growth in Providers Fee) 
Although the diﬀerence in growth seems small, it results in meaningful diﬀerences in the to-
tal fee, because the base for the fee is so large ($14.3 billion for the 2017 premium revenues, 
collected in 2018). A 5% growth rate for the national aggregate premiums is also assumed 
used when using equation (3) to determine the total impact of the waiver on providers fee 
size. Table A1 displays the total providers fee under each scenario, and the diﬀerence in 
those fees. The waiver will not impact the total fee in 2018, because the size of the 2018 
fee is already determined. In collection years 2019 to 2026, the proposed waiver will reduce 
the size of the total fee collected. The proposed waiver will reduce the amount collected in 
the insurer tax by $900,353 in fee year 2019. The reduction in total fees collected is larger 
with each year, because the size of the market increases and the diﬀerence in total premiums 
between the waiver and baseline scenarios increases as well (See Figure 1). However, the size 
of the reduction in insurer taxes collected is small relative to the size of the APTC savings. 
For example, the reduction in insurer taxes is about 1.6% of the APTC savings in 2018. The 
projected reduction in insurer taxes caused by the waiver is figured in to the total savings 
shown in Table 8. 
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Table A1: Estimated Loss in Insurer Tax 
Year Total Tax Baseline Total Tax Waiver Diﬀerence 
2018 $14,300,000,000 $14,300,000,000 $0 
2019 $15,015,455,719 $15,014,555,365 $900,354 
2020 $15,766,539,567 $15,765,527,064 $1,012,503 
2021 $16,554,996,233 $16,553,959,220 $1,037,013 
2022 $17,383,073,059 $17,381,899,474 $1,173,585 
2023 $18,252,595,183 $18,251,338,967 $1,256,216 
2024 $19,165,753,265 $19,164,371,097 $1,382,168 
2025 $20,124,439,606 $20,122,900,229 $1,539,377 
2026 $21,131,069,242 $21,129,215,607 $1,853,635 
*Note: The size of the aggregated market, excluding the 
Alaskan individual market, is estimated by assuming that 
the total market premiums were equal to roughly $550B in 
2013 and applying a 5% growth rate. The estimated size 
of the market in 2013 is based on an Association for Com-
munity Aﬃliated Plans report in which it is stated that the 
$8B fee in 2014 was equivalent to a 1.47% tax rate. See 
http://www.communityplans.net/Portals/0/Exchanges/Fees%20and 
%20Taxes%20Report%20Update%20for%20the%20Exchange%20 
Requirement%20Reports.pdf for more details. The assumed 5% 
growth rate is roughly equal to the average growth in the total tax 
on insurance providers from 2019 - 2026 projected by the CBO. 
See https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-
2016/reports/51385-HealthInsuranceBaseline_OneCol.pdf for more 
details (Table 2). Projected total premiums (outside of the Alaska 
individual market) are calculated by applying the estimated growth 
in premiums at the national level in each scenario. Total premiums 
in the Alaska individual market come from Table 18 of Alaska 1332 
Waiver Application, Actuarial Analyses and Certification, Appendix 
B. 
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